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With the release of the 2016 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) requirements
for healthcare institutions to implement business continuity planning into their organizations by
November 15, 2017, the focus of business continuity and disaster recovery planning solely for
information services has now transitioned into an enterprise-wide requirement. Over the past decade,
there have been increasing numbers of naturally occurring and man-made disasters that have
significantly interrupted or altogether closed healthcare facilities, impacting the health and well-being of
entire communities. This study examines the changing regulatory landscape that requires healthcare
institutions to develop, maintain, and regularly test their business continuity plans in an effort to enhance
their operational resiliency. After a retrospective review of regulations, guidelines, and best practices,
this study pilots an addition to the Kaiser Permanente hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA) tool that is
intended to enable healthcare organizations to objectively identify, prioritize, and maintain their business
continuity and emergency management planning efforts through the identification of potential
operational and financial impacts to healthcare facilities during and following disasters. The major
benefits of this study are to identify the historical shortcomings of a healthcare facility’s hazard and risk
identification processes and to facilitate the use of the information collected during that process.
Identified inadequacies from past healthcare preparedness efforts will be used to form new meaningful
4

efforts to enhance the recognition of risks to healthcare organizations, in an effort to enhance their
resiliency to interruptions of services and to minimize financial losses during austere events.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background and Need
For more than a decade, a large number of man-made and naturally occurring disasters have
devastated entire communities. Several of these disasters have crippled or destroyed healthcare facilities,
leading to a disruption of healthcare services within those communities (Leonard, 2006). Hospitals and
other healthcare facilities are part of the critical infrastructure within a community, making their
existence and operational capabilities necessary to maintain the health of the population. For this reason,
maintaining the operational resilience and financial viability of healthcare facilities during man-made or
naturally occurring disasters is an important part of a community’s overall well-being (World Health
Organization, 2008).
The existing tools for prioritizing hazards and vulnerabilities have been ineffective at engaging
healthcare institution executives in the planning and physical mitigation efforts. The below table
summarizes the current tools available to hospitals and health systems to utilize in determining risks to
their operations and overall resiliency (Braun B, 2006).
As interruptions of healthcare services due to man-made and naturally occurring disasters
continue to increase in frequency and severity, more effective risk identification and prioritization tools
are needed to advert these hazards from interrupting healthcare operations. The purpose of the hazard
identification and risk assessment tools is to prioritize and to address the impact that various hazards
could have on a healthcare facility (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017).
The Joint Commission (TJC) and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does not
recommend a method or tool to determine risks and hazards to healthcare institutions; however, the term
“Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment” has been frequently used in Joint Commission regulatory
manuals and guidance (Braun B, 2006). One of the most commonly used tools is the Kaiser Permanente
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HVA tool. This tool, along with the University of California Los Angeles’ (UCLA) Hazard Risk
Assessment Instrument, provides the framework for many healthcare organizations’ hazard assessments.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) have implemented various executive orders and legislative acts to outline the
expectations that CMS has for healthcare providers and suppliers regarding their roles in a unified
emergency preparedness system with community partners.
Healthcare organizations need to remain operational before, during, and after disasters. To
enhance the level of hazard planning conducted by healthcare organizations, CMS released the “Final
Rule” on September the 8, 2016. The “Final Rule” mandate is officially referred to as the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs’ “Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating
Providers and Suppliers Final Rule.” The Final Rule “focuses on three key essentials necessary for
maintaining access to healthcare during disasters or emergencies: safeguarding human resources,
maintaining business continuity, and protecting physical resources” (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2017). This rule is meant to create consistent emergency preparedness requirements for the
seventeen different healthcare facility provider types that receive funding from Medicare and Medicaid
programs. It is understood that there are unique differences among healthcare facilities and their
patients; however, the guidelines set forth by CMS were developed as a standard to cover all
hazards/disasters while still addressing the differences in all settings. The assumption of these CMS
requirements is intended to create appropriate planning and coordination with local agencies prior to and
following a disaster.
This new mandated effort is meant to bolster emergency planning coordination, response and
recovery efforts among healthcare facilities and other critical community services during disasters, while
meeting the intended outcome of the Final Rule. The release of the Final Rule was prompted by
identified inadequacies of healthcare facilities to continue to provide needed health services during and
immediately following disasters. The three main inadequacies identified by healthcare facilities were
communication, contingency planning, and training of personnel (CMS, 2016).
9

Since the release of the new CMS rule, the leadership within healthcare facilities are striving to
develop capabilities to maintain higher levels of operational resiliency during austere events. Sustaining
access to healthcare and delivery of health services at normal operating capacities will ensure that
healthcare facilities are able to maintain continuity of operations and business processes through
enterprise-wide coordinated planning efforts. Due to the recent release of these new regulations, the
adherence to the new regulations has not yet been determined.
The objective of developing and maintaining higher levels of operational resiliency for
healthcare organizations is aimed at sustaining access to healthcare at normal pre-disaster operating
capacities. To ensure new emergency preparedness regulations are being followed, the new guidelines
were incorporated into the CMS Conditions of Participation (CoPs), Conditions for Coverage (CoCs)
and Conditions for Certification, meaning that the payments to healthcare facilities from CMS would be
withheld, for those organizations that were found to not be adhering to the new regulations (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017). The governance and enforcement of these new federal
regulations of healthcare facilities are to be carried out by the CMS and recognized healthcare
accrediting agencies, such as The Joint Commission (TJC).
Many healthcare organizations and other Medicare/Medicaid participants prior to the release of
the Final Rule of November 15, 2017, had not previously considered the operational interruption(s) of
various services during a disaster in the detail that is needed, thus leaving providers financially and
operationally vulnerable. Since the rollout of the Final Rule by CMS, healthcare entities have been given
guidance through CMS and the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Readiness (ASPR) as to what
defines business continuity planning and what goes into having a successful business continuity plan
(BCP). Since the mandate was implemented in November 15, 2017, the the efforts required from
healthcare executives in business continuity planning remain unclear.
Business continuity planning
Business continuity involves in-depth planning and coordination to enable an organization’s
success, especially during disasters, when the demand for health services increases and the capacity to
10

offer those services decreases. Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is defined as "plans, procedures,
and resources to maintain and/or recover mission-critical processes and services impacted by an event
causing an interruption of normal healthcare delivery operations" (Devlen, 2017). In addition to
maintaining and recovering from austere events, BCP incorporates identification and mitigation
strategies from risks such as cyber-attacks, human error, technological failures, and naturally occurring
disasters. While previous considerations of operational interruption(s) were primarily focused on
information services and technological failures, the new all encompassing approach of healthcare
facilities towards business continuity planning is changing how healthcare organizations go about
planning to increase their resiliency. The trend of combining business continuity and disaster recovery
into a single term has resulted from a growing recognition that business and technology executives need
to collaborate closely instead of developing plans in isolation (Target, 2017).
Organizations that postpone business continuity planning are essentially operating in a reactive
mode and devising “on-the-fly” plans to correct interruptions to services as they occur. BCP allows
organizations the opportunity to continually improve their operations while decreasing the risk of harm
to operational and financial impacts from various threats such as cyber-attacks, human error,
technological failures, and natural disasters.
The healthcare industry has not embraced enterprise-wide business continuity planning at the
same level as government non-healthcare entities. Only after Congress passed the 1996 Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), did healthcare organizations begin to implement business
continuity and disaster recovery planning into their organizations. In the past two decades since the
introduction of HIPPA, business continuity planning in healthcare predominantly focused on the
information services aspect of the business (Target, 2017). In the years following 1996, regulatory
requirements of business continuity and disaster recovery were focused primarily on maintaining and
securing protected healthcare information, as well as ensuring redundancies for the continual access to
electronic health records (EHRs).
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With communities and healthcare institutions continuing to experience a significant increase in
the frequency and intensity of weather-related storms and the escalation of technological threats, a more
proactive approach towards the creation of plans, procedures, and resources is needed. The goal of
healthcare institutions should be to make mission-critical services more resilient to any austere event
that may cause an interruption to normal healthcare operations. The magnitude that a disruption could
have on a healthcare organization’s operations is still not something that is evaluated or determined by
healthcare facilities, leaving potential gaps in continuity planning efforts. Figure 1 illustrates the
equation used to determine the severity of a hazard, by subtracting mitigation efforts from the magnitude
of the hazard to arrive at the severity score (Campbell, 2011).
Figure 1. Hazard Severity Equation

MAGNITUDE

MITIGATION

SEVERITY

(Kaiser Permanente, 2017)
The bigger the vulnerability, the bigger the impact natural or man-made disasters will have on
the healthcare facility. The identification and classification of the various vulnerabilities are the initial
steps for healthcare providers before they can determine the toll the hazard will have on the
infrastructure and operating capacities for the healthcare facility. After the vulnerabilities are identified
and their potential risk(s) to the organization known, prioritization of those identified risks to the facility
can be made. The prioritization of vulnerabilities and risks to organizations helps develop mitigation
strategies to minimize or eliminate the risks to the organization. Figure 2 illustrates the calculation to
determine the relative risk; which is the identified hazard multiplied by the identified vulnerabilities
(Campbell, 2011).
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Figure 2. Relative Risk Equation

HAZARD

VULNERABILITY

RELATIVE RISK

(Kaiser
Permanente, 2017)
As healthcare reform continues to evolve, providers continue to struggle to meet the heavy
demand and costs of emergency care; this demand becomes exacerbated by large-scale disasters.
Without the ability to continue health services, insufficient capacities and financial reserves may force
hospitals to permanently close or curtail services. The integration of disaster risk reduction planning and
construction into current and future healthcare strategies will be critical to protecting the operations and
overall well-being of healthcare organizations. Additionally, coordination with and integration of
community emergency managers and emergency responders into healthcare emergency planning and
risk reduction efforts will help promote a state of resiliency for healthcare services.
The ability to continue critical services during an emergency or austere event can be defined as
“a healthcare facility’s ability to resist, absorb, and respond to an austere event while maintaining its
critical health care functions, and then recover to its original state or adapt to a new one” (CMS, 2016).
The newly released regulations require that hospitals embrace an all-hazards emergency management
program, which includes mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery strategies to improve the
overall readiness of hospitals for man-made or naturally occurring austere events.
Problem Statement
Changes included in the new CMS requirements, include member hospitals completing an
annual risk assessment or hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2017). This annual requirement of conducting an HVA is an attempt to measure the risk that
13

man-made, naturally occurring, or technological hazards may have on a healthcare facility. The KPHVA and other risk scoring tools incorporate various scoring methodologies in determining the relative
threat or risk scores, which are presented as percentages. The higher the percentages, the higher the risk
to the organization; thus the hazards with the highest risk percentages are identified as the top hazards.
The calculated scores are intended to prioritize and guide the healthcare organization in emergency
planning and in correlating mitigation efforts for their facility. When this new requirement was released,
there was no tool or guidance provided to healthcare organizations on how to complete this requirement.
With the lack of guidance to complete this task, several healthcare organizations have devised their own
tools and scoring metrics. This lack of guidance has led to confusion and uncertainty of healthcare
organizations. The true priorities of threat, vulnerability, and risk remain unclear to many healthcare
leaders. Furthermore, the multiple tools and scoring metrics have led to the underutilization of the HVA
data at the hospital or community level (Toner, 2018).
To date, the majority of research has retrospectively examined the impact of disasters on the
inpatient setting and the ability to recover post-disaster (Radcliff, 2018). While there are many
guidelines and commentaries related to how healthcare organizations should prepare and recover from
disasters, few studies have examined the effectiveness and feasibility of hazard planning tools.
Given the newness of the regulations, there is a limited evidence-base and resources available to
organizations. There are two aims of this study. First, the study evaluates existing recommendations and
frameworks for the identification, prioritization, and reduction of risks and vulnerabilities to healthcare
operations and financial well-being before, during and after disaster events. Data sources will include
government regulatory guidance, incident debriefs, journals, white papers, subject matter expert
analysis, surveys, peer identified best practices, and identified concerns.
Next using data from one health care organization, the study pilots a new tool for identifying and
prioritizing business continuity planning efforts for healthcare systems or facilities, by using potential
financial losses from interruptions to operations. This tool will be used with four different healthcare
provider types: Acute Care Hospital (ACH), Outpatient Center (OC), Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) and
14

Medical Office Building (MOB). This tool will be used in conjunction with the KP-HVA tool that is
used by the majority of healthcare organizations to determine the current risk levels of their facilities.
Research has supported the need for the inclusion of business continuity planning considerations and
projecting financial and operational impacts that identified hazards can have on healthcare
organizations. The inclusion of this quantitative data is intended to enhance healthcare resiliency
planning as well as the role healthcare leadership plays in this planning (Toner, 2018).
A potential benefit of this tool is the ability for healthcare systems and individual facilities to
better understand their loss of revenue and additional disaster-related expenses when the facility is
unable to operate. Additionally, the tool is meant to involve leadership in resiliency planning, by
providing operational and financial risks of hazards to the facility. Finally, understanding possible
financial losses during disasters will help healthcare executives make informed decisions when
determining facility operations, insurance amounts, business interruption insurance amounts, and
mitigation measures which will allow a more financially secure facility (Stryckman, 2015).
Research Questions
1. What are the benefits for healthcare organizations to prioritize business continuity efforts within their
organization to meet and/or exceed regulatory requirements?
2. Can the addition of a quantifiable financial scoring tool into the existing KP-HVA tool, calculate
potential financial losses to healthcare organizations during a disruption of services?
3. How can healthcare organizations utilize the length of disruption and financial impacts from hazards to
develop fiscal management policies and protocols?
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Methods
The collection of literature took place over six months, starting in August of 2017. The literature
review began with keywords related to business continuity in healthcare in several academic and
government databases. The inclusion criteria included literature from 2001 to present day. The terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, were the events that prompted a nationwide call to enhance
preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery, in the healthcare industry. During 2001, the founding
framework and requirement of healthcare facilities to identify and prioritize risks were established
(Osman Dar, 2014). The prioritization of reviewed literature was given to peer-reviewed journals, as this
is the basis of the data to be collected. A scoping review was also performed in order to provide an
overview of the type, extent, and quality of information available regarding emergency management
disaster planning and business continuity planning within various healthcare organizations.
Searches for related documents were queried using the Medical University of South Carolina's
online library, primarily the PubMed portal. The databases were searched using the terms "healthcare
business continuity," “healthcare risk assessments,” and "healthcare resiliency." Additional searches
utilized professional organization websites, government-sponsored data sharing repositories and
mainstream search engines to determine published regulatory guidance documents, white papers, and
historical documents. The terms used for searching for related information included "healthcare
resiliency," "healthcare business continuity," "healthcare disaster recovery," “healthcare risk
assessments,” and "healthcare continuity of operations."
Articles were selected for review if the query terms were identified in the title or the abstract of
the article within the given published timeframes. Articles that focused on healthcare outside of the
United States were included. Countries outside of the United States were included because of their
similar struggles with healthcare resiliency following disasters, while some countries, most notably
16

Australia have a robust framework of guidance for healthcare business continuity. Each of the articles
was reviewed for related context to the topic of business continuity and/or continuity of operations in
healthcare. These scoping reviews highlighted the way healthcare organizations maintain their
operations at a minimum operating level before, during and after a man-made or natural disaster.
Background
With the changes to the federal emergency preparedness mandates in 2016 for certain healthcare
entities that receive funding from the CMS, there is little existing framework in place for business
continuity planning and guidance in the healthcare sector. As part of the conditions of participation
(COP), CMS is now mandating that certain healthcare providers create, sustain, and exercise a
continuity of operations plan (COOP) on an annual basis (CMS, 2017). This new mandate took effect on
November 15, 2017, and thus healthcare organizations rushed to find guidance, literature and
comprehensive templates to meet this need (McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2017).
With virtually everyone requiring some aspect of healthcare throughout their lives, the
community’s dependency on healthcare services makes the overall resiliency of the healthcare provider
an important aspect of the overall well-being of a community (Horowitz, 2017). The identification of
risks and vulnerabilities that may impact a healthcare facility’s ability to continue critical health services
is an important part of ensuring the resiliency of that healthcare facility. Vulnerabilities and risks that are
not identified leave the healthcare organizations subject to unforeseen consequences that may damage or
limit their capacity to render services during a disaster. While many risks or vulnerabilities may be
difficult to completely eliminate, mitigation and planning may reduce these risks and vulnerabilities to
more acceptable levels. The identification and prioritization of vulnerabilities and risks to the
organization aid in the formation of mitigation and planning efforts to reduce the impacts those
vulnerabilities will have on the organization (Spiekermann, Kienberger, Norton, Briones, &
Weichchselgartner, 2015).
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As the United States’ healthcare industry continues to see economic changes, organizations are
being confronted with daily financial challenges due to the new landscape in healthcare economics. The
General Accountability Office’s report on emergency preparedness, planning, and efforts released their
findings of “State officials reported that it was difficult to continue to engage private-sector hospital
chief executive officers in emergency preparedness activities at a time when these hospitals were facing
day-to-day financial problems” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008, pp. 22-23).
Healthcare executives and clinical leadership are entrusted to protect the financial well-being of their
hospitals, so the use of funds without an immediate return on investment or a well-understood benefit to
the hospital is often viewed with disdain (Stryckman, 2015).
The risk perception of healthcare decision makers may also be negatively affected by the
traditional HVA, which is completed annually. The presentation of identified top hazards without
additional definition and meaning to healthcare executives leads to confusion on needed next steps.
Without a clear outline of how those hazards could impact an organization, leaders have difficulty
visualizing the potential impacts on the organization. A standard HVA primarily ranks hazards in their
order of priority, instead of emphasizing the elements of vulnerability that would be better addressed to
achieve true risk reductions (Osman Dar, 2014).The standard KP-HVA does not elaborate on
operational or financial impacts that the ranked hazards could have on the organization and often lacks
the needed information to engage leadership.
Further complications to the decision makers’ decision is the uncertainty of the legal community
in regard to emergency preparedness activities. There are few precedents for the liability of healthcare
providers’ identifying risks to their facilities, regulatory compliance, and poor outcomes during
disasters. The uncertainty of these issues creates precarious views on openly identifying the risks and
vulnerabilities of the organization (Ransom, 2008).
Impact of Disasters on the U.S. Healthcare Systems
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During a disaster, health facilities face closure, destroyed or damaged physical assets, displaced
workforces and patients, as well as a chaotic operational revenue cycle. Once the event is over, facilities
face possible reduced operations, capital limitations, and credit downgrades (Arain, 2015).
The often immediate and unplanned reduction of services or the complete closure of a healthcare
facility following a disaster, particularly in rural communities, creates both short-term and long-term
health, social and economic impacts to a community. Even when outages last only a few hours, there is
still a large financial impact that the healthcare organization incurs. For example, “one hour of electronic
health record [EHR] downtime can cost a practice almost $488.00 per physician, per hour for the
duration of the outage. It is estimated that the impact is approximately $43,000/00 per day for a large
physician practice or a hospital unit” (Devlen, 2017 pg. 5).
As disasters continue to impact healthcare systems throughout the United States with greater
ferocity and frequency, there are a few disasters that stand out as “iconic” disasters that changed both the
focus and regulatory landscape of healthcare preparedness. Hurricane Katrina of 2005, Super Storm
Sandy of 2012, and Hurricane Harvey of 2017 were three storm systems that stand out as especially
devastating to the healthcare community, causing both immediate and long-term impacts to multiple
healthcare organizations in the three storms’ paths.
Healthcare organizations are not alone in experiencing post-disaster hardships; the health of the
community as whole experiences adverse impacts from interruptions in health services, and this is
especially true for those with chronic diseases (Icenogle, 2016). Patients with chronic diseases such as
diabetes, human immunodeficiency virus, hypertension, and renal failure face an increase in mortality
rates following disasters to this day, even after these medically fragile populations were identified back
in 2004 during Hurricane Katrina (Icenogle, 2016).
With the interruption and/or closure of healthcare organizations and ancillary healthcare
organizations, (i.e. pharmacies, dialysis clinics etc.) there have been seen consistent increases in
19

mortality and morbidity rates in communities following a disaster (Lin, 2014). Interruptions in
healthcare services lead to a downfall in the overall health of the impacted community. Hospitals often
see a pronounced increase in demand during disasters, due to the closures of other community health
and specialty care services, such as dialysis (Lin, 2014). Following significant disasters some healthcare
facilities struggle to stay open, let alone be effective. Future of facilities to remain operational shifts the
burden of providing health services to the community to other surrounding area healthcare organizations
that are still operational.
In addition to interruptions in providing services to the public, healthcare facilities have to
contend with the immediate and often long-term financial struggles following a disaster. After Hurricane
Harvey, the most costly natural disaster in the United States to date, the Texas Hospital Association
surveyed its members impacted by Harvey. The disaster-related costs across the 92 hospitals were
estimated to be $460 million. Of the $460 million, $380 million was for operating expenses and
emergency work, $40 million for uncompensated care costs, and $40 million in other increased
operating expenses (Sanborn, 2017).
Following disasters, healthcare facilities often report significant impacts to revenue and cash
flow due to interruptions of billing and claim services, as well as from ancillary departments closing. In
addition to interruptions in billing and filing claims, office closures, reduced hours of operation,
canceled services, and decreased patient volumes all contribute to post-disaster financial stressors for
organizations (Sanborn, 2017). An example of individual facility losses during a hurricane is that of
Northwell Health in New York City, NY. Northwell Health reported a $13 million total loss during
Hurricane Irene, with $4 million being attributed to labor and supplies and $9 million to revenue lost
from hospital closures (Sanborn, 2017).
The aforementioned and unmentioned disasters of the past have all identified social and
healthcare gaps in the impacted communities, with a continued need for education, planning, and
mitigation efforts to minimize the impacts that disasters have on both healthcare facilities and the
20

medically fragile populations within the community (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011).
The closures or diminished capacities of healthcare organizations due to financial and operational strain
from these disasters are something that continues to occur, despite efforts to reduce risks and
vulnerabilities of these organizations from disasters.
Disaster Planning Guidelines and Recommendations
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) is responsible for the preparation, response, and recovery aspects of
health services, following an emergency or disaster. ASPR is responsible for developing and guiding
healthcare preparedness and response capability guidance for healthcare organizations and emergency
responders; this guidance is associated with an annual healthcare preparedness grant that is administered
through HHS-ASPR (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). ASPR,
CDC, CMS, FEMA and other federal agencies jointly collaborate and release strategic planning every
five years to enhance healthcare preparedness, as well as response and recovery capabilities of
healthcare organizations throughout the United States and its territories.
ASPR’s 2017-2022 release of capabilities outlines the following four capabilities:
-

Capability 1: Foundation for Health Care and Medical Readiness

-

Capability 2: Health Care and Medical Response Coordination

-

Capability 3: Continuity of Health Care Service Delivery

-

Capability 4: Medical Surge
The four capabilities are intended to provide a guiding light for healthcare organizations to focus
their efforts on creating and sustaining these capabilities in order to enhance their preparedness and
response efforts (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). Each of the
capabilities mentioned above contains “objectives.” The objectives and associated activities are what the
healthcare organization should implement to enhance their capability.
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The following capabilities, objectives, and activities highlight the current requirements for
healthcare organizations. ASPR’s guidance promotes a national focus on improving patient outcomes
during emergencies that exceed the day-to-day capacities of health and emergency response systems.
The purpose of the 2017-2022 HPP guidance is to incentivize diverse healthcare organizations with
differing priorities and objectives to work together collaboratively to promote healthcare delivery system
resilience in the aftermath of emergencies. The objectives and capabilities outline the ideal state of
readiness in the United States.
Table 1: ASPR Healthcare Capabilities and Objectives for Facilities
Capability
#

ASPR
Healthcare
Capability

1

Foundation for
Healthcare
Medical
Readiness

2

Healthcare and
Medical
Response
Coordination

3

Continuity of
Healthcare
Delivery

4

Medical Surge

Capability Objectives for Facilities

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.

Establish and Operationalize a Healthcare Coalition
Identify Risk and Needs
Develop a Healthcare Coalition Preparedness Plan
Train and Prepare the Healthcare and Medical Workforce
Ensure Preparedness is Sustainable
Develop and Coordinate Healthcare Organization and Coalition Plans
Utilize Information Sharing Procedures and Platforms
Coordinate Response Strategy, Resources, and Communications

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.

Identify Essential Functions for Healthcare Delivery
Plan for Continuity of Operations
Maintain Access to Non-Personnel Resources during an Emergency
Develop Strategies to Protect Healthcare Information Systems
Protect Responders’ Safety and Health
Plan for and Coordinate Healthcare Evacuation and Relocation
Coordinate Healthcare Delivery System Recovery
Plan for a Medical Surge
Respond to a Medical Surge
Source: ASPR, 2017

Some of the objectives and activities within these four capabilities are particularly critical for
health care hazard and disaster planning. “The goal of Capability 1 is to ensure that healthcare
organizations collaborate with community stakeholders to identify hazards and risks, and to prioritize
and address gaps through planning, training, exercising, and managing resources (Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017, p. 7). The primary focus of the activities in this section
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is that healthcare facilities integrate into their communities emergency planning and response efforts,
sharing identified hazards and risks to their community with one another.
Key objectives within Capability 1 include the completion of an annual HVA. This activity is meant to
determine a healthcare facility’s vulnerabilities related to naturally occurring, man-made, or technological
hazards affecting the facility and operations. The facility should identify and prioritize their risks and
vulnerabilities, while attempting to reduce those risks through mitigation measures (Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017, p. 13). Also under this capability, healthcare facility
leadership should assess and identify regulatory compliance requirements that are applicable to normal
operating levels, with the intention of enhancing planning for, responding to and recovering from disasters.
Another activity in this stage is that healthcare facilities engage health care executives in reducing risk, and
addressing facility and community needs before, during, and after disasters.
The goal of capability 3 is for healthcare facilities to provide uninterrupted, optimal medical care to all
populations in the face of damaged or disabled health care infrastructure. Facilities should regularly train,
exercise and prepare to meet the needs of their patients and community following a disaster. Response and
recovery efforts should be completed simultaneously to expedite the return to normal operations (Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). Under this capability, healthcare leadership
teams are instructed to identify essential functions for healthcare delivery. Mission essential functions
(MEFs) should identify and prioritize services to be restored following a disruption. Inpatient services,
outpatient services, skilled nursing facilities, and other health care organizations should all be considered in
this type of planning. Planning for continuity of services is both required and needed for healthcare
organizations, to be resilient from disasters. Continuity of operations planning should include operational
and financial planning during disasters and disruptions of normal operations. In addition, healthcare
facilities should plan to be able to maintain operational and financial functions during and after an
emergency or disaster. Essential business processes and financial security should be the basis of this
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planning to allow the health care organization to resume the critical services of caring for the community
which they serve in a timely manner.
Description and Background of Kaiser Permanente HVA tool
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, nationwide emergency preparedness efforts were
undertaken to enhance readiness for disasters. That year, the Joint Commission required healthcare
organizations to complete an annual hazard vulnerability analysis or risk assessment as part of their
triannual certification cycle. The purpose of this requirement was to provide a framework for hospitals
to prioritize their emergency planning efforts (McCarthy, Brewster, Hsu, Macintyre, & Kelen, 2017).
The American Society for Healthcare Engineering (ASHE) of the American Hospital Association
created the first standard HVA tool, and the Kaiser Permanente tool expanded upon the guidance and
scope of hazards that healthcare facilities should consider.
Emergency management preparedness and planning efforts rely on the assumptions made during
their creation and annual reviews. Objective data, instead of opinions alone is needed to create a solid
foundation for emergency planning and preparedness efforts. The Joint Commission defines HVA as
“the identification of hazards and the direct and indirect effects these hazards may have on the hospital”
(TJC, 2018).
This tool outlines various potential hazards that could impact a healthcare facility. There are four
choices: N/A, Low, Moderate or High, to be determined by an inter-professional group of healthcare
workers for each of the events or hazards listed in the tool. The tool starts with the scoring of the
probability of the event occurring or having an impact on the facility. After determining the probability,
the severity was determined by scoring the three impacts: human, property, and business. To complete
the severity score, the three mitigation categories are scored: preparedness, internal response, and
external response. The higher the mitigation scores, the less impact or relative threat the event would
have on the facility. The basic calculation is outlined as Severity = (Magnitude-Mitigation), showing
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that the magnitude score would be countered by the mitigation score. The final measurement combines
the probability score and severity scores to determine the overall risk/relative threat score, which is
represented as a percentage. After all the events are scored, the highest overall risk/relative threat scores
would be the most hazardous to that particular facility (Toner, 2018).
The above outlined Kaiser Permanente HVA tool met the requirements of the Joint Commission
and has since been adopted by the majority of healthcare organizations and non-healthcare emergency
preparedness departments due to its ease of use and application across multiple different types of
healthcare entities (Redwood-Campbell, 2011). One of the major outlined benefits of the KP-HVA is the
incorporation of community organization factors and individual organizations into a combined tool.
The information that is calculated by utilizing this risk scoring methodology is often collected
and filed in binders, awaiting regulatory audit(s). The intent of enhancing preparedness, planning,
mitigation, and response efforts within a healthcare institution by the identification of hazards and risks
that healthcare institutions may face is thus lost. While this tool identifies a facility's top hazards based
on the scoring methodology and inputs, this tool does not capture the attention of healthcare leadership
(Redwood-Campbell, 2011). Understanding and buy-in of leadership are needed to truly evoke a culture
of disaster preparedness and continuity of operations despite disasters.
Other Hazard Identification Tools
While the Kaiser Permanente HVA is the most commonly used tool by healthcare providers,
private and public sector agencies, there are numerous other tools that are designed to capture risk
measurements and hazard identification. These tools all take a slightly different approach in calculating
risks to an organization. While the majority of the tools used the KP-HVA tool as a guiding document to
frame their variations in data collection and scoring methodologies, Table 2 illustrates the inconsistent
nature of the current HVA process for healthcare organizations. Each tool produces slightly different
scoring metrics, thereby increasing the risk for misunderstanding of results by the users and intended
audiences.
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Analysis of Commonly Used Risk and Hazard Scoring Tools
The most commonly used risk and hazard scoring tools have been collected; and have been
identified with the intended purpose, calculation method, and limitations for each of the tools. The
collected limitations in each of the tools have been analyzed to determine the reoccurring gaps in
existing tools, and from this analysis the most commonly identified gaps have been incorporated into the
proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool. The review of existing hazard identification and risk assessment
tools confirms that there are no tools that produce a quantitative analysis of the potential financial losses
that healthcare providers could incur during an interruption of services. The importance of this finding is
that this is a key measure for healthcare executives to fully understand and take action to mitigate the
risks and vulnerabilities that are identified by these tools to protect their operations and financial wellbeing. Additionally, the review of tools concludes that the majority of those in existence took their initial
concept and guidance from the Kaiser Permanente HVA tool.
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Table 2: Summary of Existing Healthcare Hazard Vulnerability Assessment Tools
Limitations

Created by

Pennsylvania
Public Health
Risk Assessment
Tool

Tool Name

To provide an analysis of healthrelated impacts of hazards that
can occur. The tool helps
planning efforts for those
emergencies.

Risk-based on probability and
impact severity. Measures five
major domains.

Public Health Specific.
Multiple sources or various
users may skew data.

Health Hazard
Assessment and
Prioritization

Assess and prioritize planning
and mitigation efforts for
hazards. Tool offers a healthfocused mechanism to identify
and improve an agency’s
capability to prepare, respond,
and recover from potential
threats.
Provide guidance in determining
the likelihood of hazards
occurring, community
vulnerabilities, and community
resources. Potential consequences
are estimated in this tool.

Focuses on relative perceived risk,
by user-provided input scores.
Scoring is based on probability,
severity (increased
mortality/morbidity), impact on
healthcare community and the
protective values of internal and
community response readiness.
Four steps: the probability of
mishap, the severity of
consequences, scoring of the
consequences, and risk analysis.

Does not incorporate
baseline data, does not
address at-risk populations.

Drexel University
School of Public
Health. Based on
adaptations of Kaiser
Permanente’s HVA
tool.
Los Angeles
Department of Public
Health. Based on
adaptations of Kaiser
Permanente’s HVA
tool.

Kaiser
Permanente
Hazard
Vulnerability
Analysis Tool

To identify hazards, through a
systematic approach, that may
affect demand for hospital
services or ability to provide
those services.

Community
Hazard
Vulnerability
Assessment

Comprehensive analysis of the
health, property, and business
impacts of various hazards. This
tool is meant to prioritize
planning efforts, rate four phases
of emergency management, and
illustrate the operational and
regulatory impact of events.
Attempts to align emergency
management and operational
continuity efforts.
To provide resources and
templates that will assist in
locating needed information and
guidance related to the
identification of threats and
hazards and subsequent risk
assessments.

Probability and impact of threats,
mitigation, and preparedness
determine which level of risk
exists for each hazard. Risk scores
will be analyzed and used to
prioritize planning, mitigation,
response, and recovery efforts.
Evaluation of three different topics
for varying scoring includes risk
occurrence, risk response, and
non-weighted.

UCLA Hazard
Risk Assessment
Instrument

Preparedness
Guide 201:
THIRA Guide

Purpose

Calculations Approach

Broken down into areas of
research to facilitate understanding
of risk assessments. This has no
calculations or outcomes.

Public health-specific,
cannot easily enter data or
manipulate the tool, does
not automatically generate
calculations/graphs/charts,
and does not address atrisk populations.
Hospital and healthcare
facility-specific. Does not
provide guidance manual,
instructions on the tool
does not comprehensive,
does not incorporate
baseline data.
Does not address at-risk
populations

UCLA Center for
Public Health and
Disasters.

Emergency Management
Specific, toolkit-guidance
document rather than a
tool, does not generate
calculations or graphs

Developed by FEMA

Kaiser Permanente

Children’s Hospital of
Colorado. Based on
adaptations of Kaiser
Permanente’s HVA
tool.

Source: ASPR TRACIE
Summary of Existing Tools
Several reoccurring limitations were identified in the existing risk and hazard assessment tools
used by healthcare organizations. First, the existing tools do not project financial losses or length of
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disruptions. Next, with the exception of the KP-HVA tool, none of the tools automatically generates or
calculates key factors, making it more cumbersome for administrators to enter data and visualize results.
The tools also lack comprehensive data collection that shows the entire impact the identified hazards
could have on the facility. Finally, the majority of tools do not address at-risk populations or baseline
data. The reoccurring limitations identified above were used to create and pilot the proposed addition to
the KP-HVA tool, with the intention of enhancing simplicity and responding to an identified gap.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Research Design/Method
The study uses a scoping review of published regulatory guidance, news articles, and best
practices for healthcare business continuity to answer the study questions. This exploratory method has
been used for new and emerging topics such as healthcare business continuity. Content analysis has been
used to compare regulatory guidance and existing published best practices and recommendations.
Additionally, the identified trends from the research will be used to construct proposed additions and
variations to the existing KP-HVA tool to enhance the applicability of conducting risk assessments for
healthcare organizations.
Data Analysis
The extraction of relevant information to healthcare business continuity attracted from the
aforementioned search engines and repositories has been analyzed based on the relevance of the
information to business continuity in healthcare operations. Best practices, recommendations, and
government findings have been examined to determine their potential contribution to healthcare systems
understanding, creating, implementing, or maintaining a business continuity plan. This information was
compared to the existing tools to identify gaps as shown in Table 2. During the review of existing
literature, documented issues, theories and suggestions for improving the practice, implementation, and
support to business continuity efforts have been extracted to be considered in the recommendations for
the future state of business continuity in healthcare. Identified best practices in the literature review have
been integrated into the proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool.
Development of Proposed Tool – Facility Impact Analysis Tool
Following the scoping literature review and the evaluations of existing hazard vulnerability
assessments and risk assessment tools, the accumulated findings have been used to address the identified
shortfalls of the current HVA process, by proposing an addition to the existing KP-HVA tool. From the
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literature have aided in the creation of a pilot tool to minimize the subjectivity of the established HVA.
This proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool has been constructed in collaboration with the Director of
Business Continuity and Emergency Pareparedness at Kaiser Permanente, along with subject matter
experts in the field of healthcare business continuity and preparedness.
The additional section of the KP-HVA may facilitate an enhanced role in the HVA process and
better understanding of the data. The pilot tool maintains the existing framework and ranking of
potential hazards to an individual facility from the standard KP-HVA tool, while introducing new fields
to determine the length of disruption and financial impacts from each of the identified top hazards.
Traditionally, an inter-professional group participates in the annual KP-HVA process, usually including
the following core areas:
-

Leadership
Facilities/Engineering
Clinical
Emergency Management

After completion of the KP-HVA tool, the healthcare leadership team will use their facility’s
annual budget to separate the annual revenue projections for inpatient services, outpatient services and
emergency room, and/or any applicable services at their facility. The annual revenue projections are to
be inputed into the identified columns, with the top ten ranked hazards from the standard KP-HVA
automatically populated after completion of the standard KP-HVA. The three service types are separated
throughout the tool, allowing the unique characteristics of each of the service types to be captured, while
still allowing an accurate projection of the impacts to the entire facility. Each of the aforementioned
service types have been found to operate and to be impacted differently during disasters; therefore they
have been separated.
Next, the finance tab has the following new fields for operational impacts from the identified
hazards: hours operational each week, projected number of hours impacting services, percentage of
operations able to be maintained, percentage of services to be recovered, and total additional expenses
from the disaster. The fields are to be completed by the same group that completes the standard KP30

HVA. The value of each of the fields is to be determined based off historical information, financial
information, facility characteristics, and operational capacities.
All the information that is inputted into the “finance” tab is automatically transferred over to the
“summary” tab where the scored length of disruption for inpatient, outpatient, and ER is illustrated in
hours for each of the top ranked hazards. Additionally, the financial losses for each of the service lines
and entire facility are calculated, again by the different hazards. The final feature of the summary tab is
the breakdown of hourly revenue for each service type, not based off any specific hazard. This
breakdown provides financial loss projections to leadership for any event that causes interruptions to
operations by illustrating the average revenue captured each hour the service type/facility is operational.
Lastly, two additional fields have been added to the “data” tab of the KP-HVA tool for capturing
the actual length of the disruption and/or fiancnial impacts of events that have occurred in that calendar
year. This capturing of actual data from the length of disruptions and financial impacts will help in the
construction of more accurate projections of the impacts that hazards will have on healthcare facilities.
Since the tool could be utilized by seventeen different healthcare provider types identified by the
CMS that are required to complete an annual HVA, it must be adaptable to the different service lines of
each facility. Three different distinct facility service types have been identified, due to their unique
characteristics during various disasters. Based on the operational service lines, each facility may
complete one or more of the following service modules: Inpatient, Outpatient, and Emergency Room.
Leaders of each of the three service types will identify the projected length of disruption from the
hazard, as well as input their unique information related to operational and financial impacts to their
facility.
Sample Selection
The proposed additions to the KP-HVA tool were piloted using four different healthcare provider
types. The sites were purposefully selected using a convenience sample of one healthcare organization
located in the Southeastern United States. The participating healthcare system is the largest in their state,
with locations in 12 counties. All the facility participants were part of the same healthcare system. The
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sample was selected to test the feasibility and usability of the additions to the KP-HVA tool in the
following healthcare settings: Acute Care Hospital, Skilled Nursing Facility, Outpatient Surgery Center,
and Physician Practice. The pilot tests were conducted in conjunction with the annual HVA during the
first quarter of the calendar year of 2018. The pilot testing for the four different provider-types
incorporated the new additions to the tool, using the same methods of group facilitation to score each
hazard’s impact and preparedness measurements on the organization.
Data Collection Procedure
Data to test the tool was inputted into a survey database during the annual HVA assessment
meeting. Each facility assigned an appropriate person or group of persons with access to the operational
and financial information to fill out this survey. The determination of answers to questions was made by
facility leadership, financial department representative(s), facility representatives and emergency
preparedness officials, using historical data and best projections of potential impacts to the facility. Each
facility was instructed to bring to the meeting their 2018 annual budget separated into three distinct
service types within that organization: Inpatient, Outpatient, and Emergency Room. The three different
service types were determined based on their unique characteristics and role during disasters (Horowitz,
2017). While some of the participating organizations had all three service types or only one service type,
they were all able to successfully complete the piloting with no deviations needed in collecting and
determining the score of the HVA or financial information. The identification of the facilities that
participated in the survey was omitted to protect the proprietary financial information and identified
vulnerabilities for each of the facilities.
The integration of the proposed tool with the KP-HVA tool was done by collecting financial and
operational information from the facility. The leadership was asked to identify the top three hazards that
were potential risks to their facility and in that community. Potential hazards included active shooter,
bomb threat, dam failure, drought, earthquake, fire, flood, gas leak, generator failure, hurricane, IT
system outage, pandemic, tornado, and tsunami. Next, the facility leadership scored each hazard on the
impacts it would have on humans, property; then the facility scored their preparedness, internal response
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and external response capabiltiies, which combined created the risk score. The additional data was
collected in an added tab “finance” that captured information to determine potential financial and
operational losses during interruptions of service for each of the top ten hazards. The questions were
used to determine the projected length of disruption for each of the top hazards and additional costs that
the facility could incur from that hazard. The collected financial information was inputed into the tool,
with the scoring of length of disruption and additional expenses to determine the financial loss that the
hazard would have on the facility.
Immediately following the completion of the annual KP-HVA with proposed new changes, the
chief operating officer or ranking facility leader was provided a four-question survey (Table 3), asking
about their perspective on the feasibility and applicability of this addition to the KP-HVA. The questions
of this survey were as follows: Does new data enhance your knowledge of financial/operational
vulnerabilities from disasters?, Does new data make KP-HVA more meaningful to your position?, Do
you feel as though this new additional data will help make a stronger case for mitigation efforts?, Did
additional data input take less than 15 minutes to complete? The intent of this survey was to determine
the immediate reaction and usability of the proposed additions to the leader of the identified facilities.
Additionally, an informal discussion with the participating group and facility leader was conducted,
focusing on their perceptions, recommendations, and applicability regarding the proposed additions to
the KP-HVA tool.
Finally, twenty-three healthcare and community members of a regional consortium were engaged
in a written survey during a quarterly meeting to determine their perceptions on conducting their own
risk and hazard vulnerability assessments. Additionally, the survey asked about its usefulness in
measuring various operational and financial risks. Of the twenty-three participants, all but one of the
participants utilized the standard KP-HVA.
The regional consortium is comprised of multidisciplinary healthcare and community members
that are responsible for providing health services or emergency response before, during and following a
disaster. The survey of these individuals had these five questions: Do you use the data from your risk
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assessment or HVA tool to prioritize business continuity planning?, Do you use the data from your risk
assessment or HVA tool to determine potential financial losses during a disaster?, Do you determine the
potential length of disruption of health services for the facility?, Based on the identified hazards in the
HVA, do you feel as though the current summary of indormation on the risk assessment or HVA is
meaningful to facility leadership? Each question had three different response choices: Yes, No, or Not
Sure. The survey was completed at the beginning of a quarterly meeting. Each of the twenty-three
members filled out the survey, with some members representing more than one organization type. The
members that were representing more than one organization type were scored under both sections.
Surveys were collected from the participants following the meeting, results being shown in Table
4. The surveys were reviewed for any missed questions or anomalies by the participants, with all
questions being answered and no observed anomalies. To limit any potential bias that background or
discussions may have on the participants’ answers, the participants were given instructions on the
general overview and intention of the survey, but no discussions surrounding the questions was
conducted.
Pilot Study
The data collected via the survey was then inputted into the pilot KP-HVA tool, in the financial
tab where the sum projections of the financial losses and length of disruptions are outlined for
incorporation into the overall KP-HVA tool’s summary. All of the calculations to determine the hourly
loss of revenue were embedded into the tool, along with instructions to outline the equation and the
process to arrive at those numbers. The projected length of disruption and financial losses will
accompany the top three hazards; the financial loss rate is calculated by the hour for disruption of
services used in any of the hazards in the KP-HVA tool. There was a facilitated discussion of the groups
completing the new additions to the KP-HVA tool in which they were encouraged to present their initial
perceptions of ease of use, as well as future implications of collected information and usability in an
open forum. The notes from the facilitated discussions were captured, and some clarifying questions
were asked to ensure appropriate understanding of items being discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Pilot Tool Results
During this pilot project, a financial director for each of the four facility types participated in the
scoring of the KP-HVA. The different organization types were used to capture the unique characteristics
of each different provider type, as well as to ensure the usability of this addition to the KP-HVA tool
with the different provider types. The four different healthcare provider types used for the pilot study are
listed in Table 3. Each of the participating facilities was not for profit, but each of the facilities provides
a mix of different services.
Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of Pilot Study Provider Types
Provider
Type
Acute Care
Hospital
Skilled
Nursing
Facility
Physician
Practice
Outpatient
Surgery
Center

# Beds

Status

45

Not For
Profit
Not For
Profit

120

12 Exam
Rooms
4 Surgery
Suites

Not For
Profit
Not For
Profit

Inpatient
Services
Yes

Outpatient
Services
Yes

Emergency
Room
Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Rural Acute Care Hospital (ACH)
The acute care hospital studied is a licensed 45-bed facility that is in a rural area, and that is part
of a larger healthcare system. The inpatient and emergency room services are operational 24/7 a day,
365 days a year while the outpatient services have extended Monday-Friday operational business hours.
This hospital offers the following services:
-

General Medicine Beds (Inpatient)
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC – Inpatient)
Rehabilitative Services (Outpatient/Inpatient)
Diagnostics and Imaging (Outpatient/Inpatient)
Emergency Room (Outpatient)
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Suburban Outpatient Surgery Center (OPSC)
The outpatient surgery center that was used in the study and is located in a busy urban area,
which has four outpatient operating suites. This center conducts non-acute outpatient surgeries five days
a week, with traditional business hours. This center offers the following services:
-

General Surgery
GI Surgical Procedures
Ophthalmology

Rural Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF)
The skilled nursing facility that was used in the pilot project has a licensed bed capacity of 120
beds and is located in a rural county.. This facility is an inpatient facility that does not offer outpatient
rehabilitative services. This facility is budgeted and regularly operates at 95% of their capacity
throughout the year. This facility offers the following services:
-

Skilled Nursing (Inpatient)
Rehabilitative Services (Inpatient)
Metropolitan Physician Practice – Family Medicine (PP)
The identified physician practice for this pilot project has twelve active exam rooms that
specialize in internal medicine and is located in an urban area. The practice employs 15 full-time
physicians, with other advanced practitioners as part of their staffing. The practice is operational
Monday-Friday with traditional business hours. This facility offers the following services:

-

Primary Care – Family Medicine (Outpatient)

Pilot Study Results
Top Identified Hazards
All four facilities were able to collect the necessary data to complete the pilot modules of the
KP-HVA. There was a wide range of hazards selected by the four facilities for this module. The most
commonly identified hazards were HVAC Failure (n=2), and tornado (n=2). Other potential hazards
were communication/telephone failure, internal flood, inclement weather, IT system outage, generator
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failure, water interruption, and epidemic. The hazards were identified by using historical data of the
listed hazards that have directly or indirectly affected the operations of that particular facility.
The historical data for each of the facilities was collected from the South Carolina Emergency
Management Division (SCEMD) and the county emergency management department where the facility
is located. Participants were given instructions to score any hazard that occurs more than once a year as
a “high” probability, hazards that occur every 2-3 years as “moderate” probability, hazards that occur 3
or more years as a “low” probability, and any hazard that is not possible as “N/A”.
Two similarities were noted in the results; both were with alike provider types. Both the inpatient
facilities, ACH and SNF had listed tornado as one of the top three hazards to their facility, with the ACH
ranking the tornado as the highest risk and the SNF ranking it the third highest risk. The rationale and
discussion behind ranking tornado in the top three for both inpatient facilities was that a tornado can
cause significant damage, facility evacuations, and long-term inability to utilize the facility.
Additionally, both of the outpatient facilities ranked HVAC failure as their third highest ranking hazard
for their facilities. HVAC was chosen in the top three due to the inability to render any services while
the HVAC was not operational. The outpatient surgery center and physician practice would elect to
cancel appointments and surgeries until the HVAC system was restored. The outpatient surgery center
added that they would not be able to maintain humidity levels, or ensure sterile environments for their
patients in the event of this type of failure, while the physician practice cited that the patients’ comfort
and satisfaction would be greatly impacted.
Estimated Length of Disruptions
The length of disruptions is estimated in the total hours that the facility is closed or unable to
render services during the different hazards. The length of disruptions is calculated in hours, as some
disasters are short-lived, while others are calculated in days. The identification of hazards that would
completely disrupt services, along with the length of time during which they could disrupt services is
especially important in the continuity planning and risk mitigation, as this calculation results in the
highest operational and financial impacts.
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Both the inpatient facilities scored the disruption length of services from each of their hazards as
lower than their outpatient counterparts. The inpatient facilities scored the length of disruptions as low
due to the fact that their patient population would remain in their care, unless evacuation was warranted.
The SNF did estimate that both the water interruption and tornado would cause 10 hours of disruption to
their services, specifically inpatient rehab. The SNF identified that while the rehabilitative services are
for inpatient use only, the providers for those services are outsourced from a different company, which
would likely result in cancellation of rehabilitation patient services. The cancelled services would not be
billable to insurance, unless they were rescheduled, which would be at the discretion of the provider.
Both the outpatient facilities estimated full-day closures (10 hours) for their third highest ranking
hazard, HVAC failure. Communication/telephone failure and epidemic were estimated to not cause any
disruption to operations, the internal flood was estimated to disrupt 30 hours, and severe weather was
estimated to disrupt 20 hours. Both the facilities indicated that in both circumstances they would attempt
to reschedule or reassign appointments to an unimpacted same facility type if possible, which they have
done in the past successfully.
Increased Additional Expenses
Increased additional expenses were broken down into four different categories for groups to
estimate potential costs based on the hazards they were scoring. The four categories were increased
labor costs, increased supplies and consumable costs, increased contractual expenses (excluding labor)
and increased repair and replacement costs. These four categories were identified due to their
applicability to historical damage categorization by FEMA, and discussion of them in the literature
review.
The estimated additional expenses for both the inpatient facilities (ACH and SNF) were
significantly higher than the two facilities that solely provided outpatient services. The participants for
each of the inpatient services referenced the need for them to continually maintain sufficient levels of
care to their patients, throughout any disaster. The increased labor (estimated to be $5,000-$15,000 per
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incident/per service type) and contract costs ($10,000-$25,000 per incident/per service type) were
identified as two “major additional expenses that usually accompany disasters.”
The research showed that the increased repair and replacement costs estimated for HVAC failure
were the same for both the PP and OPSC, and HVAC failure was ranked as their third highest hazard.
The potential reasoning for the same projections for the replacement/repair costs was the same
engineering/facility representative was present for both the facility types.
The feedback from the hospital group idicated that knowing the hourly loss of revenue rate as
$16,162.00 per hour for all services would be beneficial during and after a disaster to financial analysts
and organization leaders. The group went on to add that currently they are able to track the number of
surgeries/procedures rescheduled; however they are unable to determine if those rescheduled
appointments were kept.
Estimated Percentage of Normal Operations to be Maintained During a Disaster
The estimation of normal operations to be maintained during a disaster is aimed at capturing the
lesser percentage of disruptions to services, instead of the total closure of the facility as documented in
the total disruption of services. The estimated reductions in services is a way to quantify the impact that
hazards can have on the various types of services.
Again, there were notable differences between inpatient and outpatient facilities, with the
inpatient facilities showing a lesser impact of operations from disasters than outpatient facilities. As
previously outlined, inpatient services maintain their services unless there is an evacuation of all or part
of the patient population. The outpatient services scored the ability to maintain services at 0% for all of
their top hazards, with the exception of HVAC failure, which was scored at 25% capacity and 85% for
communication/telephony failure for the physician practice. The physician practice concluded that a
telephone failure could impact future appointments being scheduled, but would have minimal impact on
the current day’s operations. Additionally, the physician practice rated the HVAC failure at 25% due to
some patients choosing to be seen, regardless of this failure.
Estimated Percentage of Services That Could be Recovered
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Capturing the difference between total revenue loss and temporary revenue loss from an
interruption in services, estimated percentage of services being recovered is intended to identify the
services that the facility can recover following the interruption of services. The calculation of services
recovered is illustrated as a percentage which is subtracted from the service type revenue losses during
the interruption.
Both inpatient and outpatient groups commented the majority of their services could be
rescheduled; however the financial directors admitted this data is something that is not readily available
nor has it been tracked in the past. The participants mentioned that this capability could be present in
their EHR, but if so, it could only outline the initial rescheduling of the appointment, not the participant
keeping the appointment.
The outpatient services identified that the majority of their services were able to be recovered or
rescheduled, as their caseload was predominantly elective cases. Additionally, the outpatient services
did again mention that they would attempt to reassign patient appointments to other unaffected similar
locations, and/or extend operating hours of their site upon resuming operations. Inpatient services again
mentioned that their inpatient populations would remain in the facility, causing them to score all of their
recovered services at 100%.
Stakeholder Feedback
Results of the post-survey group discussion include the following themes. First, each facility
found the additional information insightful into the impacts of the hazards, citing that historically they
had not considered the implications that these hazards could have on their facilities. Each setting
identified specific features and benefits that were more useful than others. A common theme was that
the additional information gives leadership and managers a basis to make informed decisions during
disasters. Specifically, skilled nursing and outpatient representatives felt that projecting additional
expenses from disasters is helpful for managers to understand. These two stakeholder types also
indicated the additional tracking of financial and operational disruption would be a useful addition when
completing the annual KP-HVA. The family practice group has never completed an annual KP-HVA, as
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this is a new CMS requirement for the setting. The physician practice respondent also noted that
differentiating between appointments that are rescheduled and those that are fulfilled would be
beneficial to know and this capability does not currently exist. Although this is their first time
completing this type of exercise, the practice leadership views this information favorably, and believes it
will be helpful when determining closures or alterations in operational hours.
Discussions from the outpatient surgery group were focused on the decision-making process of
closures and alterations of traditional schedules during disasters, with some desire from the group to
more firmly outline timelines for making these decisions, as several of their patients have pre-surgery
preparation activities at their residence, which would not be needed if cancellations were to take place.
The group also discussed the post-disaster rescheduling of patients, factoring in the potential need for
increasing hours of operations to ensure that the patients receive their care in a timely manner, for their
surgery schedules are set many months in advance. Lastly, the group considered the potential need to
increase operating hours to their site, as well as the feasibility of shifting canceled cases to other
affiliated surgery centers.
All facility respondents agreed that a reference table of previous disasters and the average length
of disruption the disasters caused similar institutions would be useful when projecting the length of
disruption. The description and intention of the new fields in the “data” table of the KP-HVA tool were
described to the groups, with the groups agreeing that over time the collection of similar events could
help to limit the subjectivity of this particular scoring field.
Each financial director voiced concerns about the subjectivity of scoring the estimated length of
disruptions for each of their identified top hazards, with some disagreements and questions being voiced
by the participants. There were some questions and confusion from each of the respondents.
Specifically, they were asking for additional clarification, predominantly around the intensity of the
hazard being discussed.
Survey of Leadership
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Immediately following the completion of the annual KP-HVA scoring and the proposed financial
calculations, each respondent was given a paper survey asked four questions.
All four facility representatives agreed on three of the four items (Table 4):
1. The data enhanced their knowledge of financial and operational vulnerabilities from disasters;
2. The new data made the KP-HVA more meaningful to their leadership position; and
3. The new additional data will help make a stronger case for justifying mitigation efforts and planning
The timing of the additional data was intended to determine if the new additional information to
be collected would increase the time it takes to complete the KP-HVA by more than 15 minutes. The
survey showed that 75% of the participants said that the additional information took less than 15 minutes
to complete, while the rural acute care hospital cited it took longer than 15 minutes to complete.
The conclusion of this survey reveals that healthcare leaders that participated in this study do see
a benefit in the additional calculations, even when there is a lengthier time commitment for completion.
Leadership participants were geninuely curious about the tools’ ability to anticipate financial and
operational impacts from hazards, citing that historically they have not known of these impacts when
making decisions.
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Table 4: Post Study Completion – Participant Survey Results
Post Pilot Survey
Questions

Acute Care
Hospital

Skilled Nursing
Facility

Outpatient
Surgery Center

Physician
Practice

(Response Choices)

(Yes – No – Not Sure)

(Yes – No – Not Sure)

(Yes – No – Not Sure)

(Yes – No – Not Sure)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Leadership – Does
new data enhance
your knowledge of
financial/operational
vulnerabilities from
disasters?
Leadership – Does
new data make KPHVA more
meaningful to your
position?
General – Do you
feel as though this
new additional data
will help make a
stronger case for
mitigation efforts?
HVA Group – Did
additional data input
take less than <15
minutes?

Regional Healthcare Coalition
Results of the regional consortium survey indicate that there are some similarities and
differences in responses from the different healthcare facility types, as well as the non-healthcare
community participants.
The similarities across respondents shows the current summary of information on the risk
assessment or HVA is meaningful to facility leadership. Additionally, across all respondents and facility
types, a large majority use the HVA to determine the length of disruption of their services. A notable
similarity across the majority of all healthcare providers, as well as non-healthcare entities is that they
do not currently use their risk assessments to determine financial impacts from the potential hazards.
Identified differences amongst the different facility types are most notable in the responses for
the use of the HVA to prioritize business continuity planning with 100% of skilled nursing facility
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respondents answering that they use their HVA to determine business continuity planning while only
22% of hospital respondents and 25% other healthcare facility types use the information for that
purpose.
The collected survey was intended to illustrate basic views and uses of different healthcare
facility types and non-healthcare entities. The survey shows that healthcare preparedness professionals
in this consortium do feel as though the information summarized in the HVAs is useful to their
leadership, for capturing financial and operational risks to their organizations is not something being
calculated or represented in their hazard assessments.
Table 5: Regional Healthcare C

Use of HVA with Financial
Loss
25
20
15
10
5
0

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 9
Hospital
9
2
8
3
9
2
10
0
Skilled Nursing 7
0
4
3
6
1
3
0
Other
4
1
2
3
3
2
4
0
oalition Survey Results

(Question 3): Do you use the data from your risk assessment or HVA tool to prioritize business continuity
planning?
(Question 4): Do you use the data from your risk assessment or HVA tool to determine potential
financial losses during a disaster?
(Question 5): Do you determine the potential length of disruption of health services for the facility,
based on the identified hazards in the HVA?
(Question 9): Do you feel as though the current summary of information on the risk assessment or HVA
is meaningful to facility leadership?
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Introduction
The intent of this doctoral project was to identify the inadequacies and shortfalls of the
existing framework and regulations regarding the process for scoring and prioritizing risks and
vulnerabilities to healthcare providers. The identification of the gaps within the annual risk and
hazard assessments led to development and incorporation of the new elements designed to
overcome the identified shortfalls into the process and create more meaningful and compelling
information regarding the risks and hazards, namely to identify: what do these risks and
vulnerabilities mean to the organization. Quantifying the potential financial and operational
impacts to a healthcare facility will help healthcare leadership make informed decisions about
investing in mitigation measures to protect their facility before the storm, as well as supporting
their operational decisions during a disaster.
Identifying and including the potential operational and financial impacts from each of the
hazards on the Kaiser Permanente – HVA tool provides quantifiable comprehensive look into the
impacts that hazards will have on a facility. The inclusion of projected length of disruption and
financial losses from each hazard into the KP-HVA tool was identified through the survey as
enhancing the purpose and understanding meaning of the annual risk assessment for healthcare
leaders.
The various group participants and leadership for each of the different facility types
overwhelmingly acknowledged the benefit that this additional information could make in
prioritizing business continuity and resiliency planning, as well as in making operational
decisions before, during, and after a disaster has impacted their facility. The conclusions of the
pilot study and surveys show that there is a lack of utilization of the HVA, due largely to the lack
of information compelling healthcare leadership to act on their identified risks and
vulnerabilities.
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Overview of Findings
The findings of this study suggest that various types of healthcare facilities and
leadership understand the importance and intentions of completing risk and hazard assessments,
but are unable to make the results of these tools minimize operational and financial risks to their
facilities, as they are intended to do. Group discussions and results of the study suggest that there
is a lack of meaning in the output of the existing risk and hazard assessment tools. Currently
different individuals from all facility types outlined various ways of utilizing the collected data
before, during, and after a disaster. The facilitated discussions led to a more thorough
understanding of the impacts that disasters can have on their facilities, both short and long-term.
Facility leadership communicated that they feel more comfortable discussing risks to
their facilities with quantitative projections of operational and financial impacts from the
identified hazards. Additionally, leadership cited that in the past they often understood the
hazards to their facilities and even some of the vulnerabilities; however, they felt as though there
was a lack of communication to them regarding the next steps to minimize the presented risks.
The Chief Opporating Officer of the acute care hospital revealed that cost-benefit analysis and
proposals from departmetns were an everyday part of their responsibilities, making them feel
more comfortable with numbers and projections in front of them to aide in their decisions. In his
summary, he wants to know, what happens if we do not do this (mitigation efforts)?
Research Question # 1 Findings
This study set out to determine the benefits to healthcare facilities of prioritizing their
business continuity planning efforts, for the research has shown that 48% of healthcare facilities
as of 2017 felt as though they were not able to meet the requirement of creating business
continuity plans. Research completed from this study has shown that through the identification of
quantifiable operational and financial impacts to a facility, healthcare leadership is more likely to
seek out risk reduction and mitigation strategies to lessen the impact that the hazards can have on
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their facility. Leadership cited that the ability for them to reference quantifiable financial risks to
the facility could be paired with a standard cost-benefit analysis to determine the financial
feasibility of implementing risk reduction measures.
Research Question # 2 Findings
The additions to the KP-HVA tool illustrate that it is possible to calculate potential
financial losses to a healthcare facility during disasters or interruptions to their normal
operations. Additionally, the tool is able to determine the revenue generated each hour for the
various facility types, meaning that even if the disruption of services were to last longer than
initially anticipated, the facility could determine financial losses for the new length of disruption
to their services. The various man-made, naturally occurring, and technological hazards that are
included in the KP-HVA all have the potential to interrupt business operations, available
services, and revenue streams. The new additions to the KP-HVA tool will allow healthcare
facilities the ability to quantify those interruptions and impacts from the aforementioned hazards.
Research Question # 3 Findings
Through the exploration of the pilot study and facilitated discussions following the completion of
the study, the ability to utilize the financial and operational information to determine fiscal management
policies and procedures was confirmed by financial analysts and facility leaders. This information
prompts revisting business interruption insurance levels and quantify financial and operational
disruptions to services by the different hazards identified in the KP-HVA tool. Future versions should
include additional clarification and instructions, predominantly around the intensity of the hazard being
discussed. In addition, sample data estimating the length of disruption for hazards would help financial
directors to better project the amount of time a facility could be impacted.
Discussion of Results in Consideration of Future Research
As enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity is still in the infancy stages of
development, there are numerous areas within this field of study that could benefit from further
research. The topics of disaster risk assessment and hazard vulnerability assessment on
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healthcare facilities have been lacking in the field of academic research studies. The lack of
research studies in the fields of risk and hazard assessments in healthcare has prompted
skepticism and uncertainty regarding the required annual assessment. Lack of buy-in is
especially true in healthcare leaders who are one of the intended audiences for the results of the
assessment.
The research from the collected pilot study survey responses shows that facility leadership
appreciates and is more comfortable with objective financial and operational data, as this is what
they are accustomed to when making other leadership decisions. Future research should
incorporate this finding as a basis for additional research projects. The identification and
customization of additional data in the presentation of risk and hazard assessments to a targeted
audience of healthcare executives and decision-makers should be a priority, as these persons in
healthcare are the ones who determine financial and organizational priorities. In addition, future
studies should examine the accuracy of the projected data such as the estimated hours of
disruption that occur in a healthcare facility during a disaster. A discussion item identified in the
ACH group discussion was the feasibility of projecting patient satisfaction scores or Hospital
Consumer Assessment of Healthare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) following a disaster. The
recommendation for this potential inclusion into facility predictions of the risks stems from the
HCAHPS score being tied to CMS reimbursements, meaning potential additional financial
impacts (short-term and long-term) that these various hazards can have on an facility.
Implications of the Study
The financial and operational impacts that hazards have on healthcare facilities continue
to rise. While healthcare facilities have been required to complete an annual risk and
vulnerability assessment for nearly two decades. The information being collected and
understanding of the intended audiences have not minimized the impacts that hazards have on
healthcare organizations since the regulatory mandate went into effect. The continued increase in
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operational interruptions from hazards, despite this mandate, has led to the evaluation and
questioning of existing risk identification efforts.
The inability of healthcare facilities to meet the new business continuity planning
standard could have severe regulatory financial penalities, in addition to the financial losses of a
disaster. CMS outlines that any participating facilities that receive reimbursements from their
program must meet the new standard, or they are in immediate jeopardy of having their
reimbursements withheld.
The finding of the research has shown that the decision makers within healthcare
organizations feel more comfortable when they have comprehensive and quantifiable
information when making operational and financial decisions for the organization. With this
information healthcare leaders feel as though they are better able to determine the need for predisaster mitigation efforts, operational decisions during the disaster, and post-event recovery
actions.
The incorporation of more objective and quantifiable information into existing mandated
risk and hazard assessment tools will reduce misunderstanding, and increase usefulness of the
annual risk assessments, and better addressing the identified needs of healthcare executives in
making informed decisions regarding the operational and financial security of their facilities.
Policy Implications
The literature review and results of this study show that healthcare facilities and leaders
consider business continuity planning as a top priority for their organizations, despite the
prediction that they will not being able to address this requirement (Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). The lack of confidence of healthcare facilities
to meet this new CMS requirement of implementing and maintaining a business continuity plan
suggests the need for additional guidance. The ability of the leaders to prioritize their business
continuity planning efforts will help healthcare facilities focus their efforts on the identified top
hazards to their facility.
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Existing annual regulatory requirements have facilities prioritizing their risks and hazards
in order to focus on hazard mitigation and inform planning efforts of healthcare facilities. The
aforementioned addition to the widely used KP-HVA tool could help prioritize business
continuity planning, in the same way that mitigation and planning efforts are prioritized with the
intention of helping healthcare facilities focus on the top vulnerabilities of their facilities.
The intent of the additional information in the KP-HVA tool is to mimic the requirement
of the current annual HVA, but with the identification of risks and vulnerabilities to the business
and operational aspects of the healthcare facility. An emphasis on annually re-evaluating the
priorities of business continuity should be combined with the annual re-evaluation of risks to the
healthcare organization. With the changing of business continuity planning to one of the top four
priorities for healthcare facilities to focus on in 2017-2022, the ability to guide healthcare
facilities in the prioritization of this undertaking should be made available. As risks to a
healthcare organization change, so do business continuity priorities. Annual review and
prioritization will help enable healthcare facilities to focus on the needed efforts to make their
facilities more resilient during disasters.
Recommendations
If the facility is seeking a more detailed analysis of losses per each department, the
survey tool should be filled out by each department leader and support team, and then the
collected information can be used independently or collectively. The inclusion of all departments
in this process would provide greater detail into the interruptions and possible additional
expenses from disasters; however, the ability to engage all departments within a facility could be
logistically difficult and time consuming for both the departments and the group collecting the
information.
As recommended by the surveyed outpatient surgery department, the capturing of actual
disruption lengths, financial , and additional expenses from events would be beneficial to this
tool. Continued tracking and capturing of events throughout the year in keeping with these
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elements added to the KP-HVA tool, would enable facilities to collate needed information to
better project impacts of hazards.
This proposed addition to the KP-HVA tool was constructed in collaboration with the
Director of Business Continuity and Emergency Preparedness at Kaiser Permanente and subject
matter experts in the field of healthcare business continuity and preparedness. The collaboration
is intended to potentially release a new optional version of the KP-HVA tool, allowing the user
to determine an operational and financial impact projection to accompany their ranking hazards.
As this dissertation is meant to add to the preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery efforts
of healthcare providers, all works and collaborations will be made publicly available for
providers to use at their discretion.
The proposed additions to the KP-HVA tool are intended to engage healthcare leadership,
risk managers, and financial analysts within the facility to make the existing information and
ranking of hazards more meaningful to intended audiences. By projecting and presenting the
operational and financial risks a hazard may have on the facility, a clear overview of hazard
impacts upon the facility will help prioritize business continuity planning and mitigation efforts
with the intent of lessening the impacts of these hazards. In addition to prioritizing efforts, the
new quantitative information will help facility leadership make informed decisions to protect
their facility from the threat of a hazard.
Limitations of the Study
The study employed a scoping review of archival published texts and data to answer the
study questions. This method of research was chosen due to the limited sources of published
articles and data on this subject due to the infancy of this new federal mandate. This
methodology allowed for a review of available literature directed to healthcare organizations and
the general public on this topic, both in regulatory guidance and published texts. The primary
limitation of this study is the dependence on publications of this topic, as well as the nature of
government regulatory guidance documents.
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With limited guidance and research being available for reference, the review of the
literature and scholarly articles was limited due to healthcare business continuity being an
emerging topic. Most of the literature in this field is about healthcare information services and
technology business continuity and disaster recovery planning, as a specific sub-topic of the
broader topic of enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity. The literature and background of
the healthcare information services continuity planning were reviewed, with some consideration
of similar findings incorporated into this project.
The pilot study portion of this project was limited to one health system with identification
of four different healthcare provider types to determine the validity of this effort to the most
prominent healthcare provider types. While the four healthcare provider types were piloted
successfully, there are a remaining thirteen different provider types that were not included in this
pilot project. Additionally, with the pilot study being composed of facilities within one
healthcare organization, there could be varying characteristics and variables in other healthcare
organizations that might skew or alter the intent and/or output of the information being collected.
Differing financial and budgeting reporting and projecting tools as well as differing
organizational business priorities could affect the usability of this tool.
Conclusion
The need for healthcare providers to be more operationally and financially resilient from
the effects of both man-made and naturally occurring disasters, as well as technological hazards
is apparent, as healthcare providers have continued to falter during and following disasters over
the past two decades, despite efforts to identify, prioritize, and mitigate their hazards. As
healthcare’s financial modeling and regulatory landscapes continue to evolve, interruptions in
provided services may create financial and regulatory hardships for healthcare providers.
As outlined in the final rule by CMS, operational and business continuity planning and
ability is listed as one of the top three priorities identified for healthcare providers to incorporate
into their emergency preparedness planning. The recent release of the final rule in November of
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2017 has tied business continuity planning to federal reimbursement funds, making the penalty
for non-compliance by providers more severe.
As enterprise-wide healthcare business continuity planning and the federal CMS
guidance regarding this requirement are still in the infancy stages, the long-term outlook and
compliance ratings of this effort are still largely unknown. While the future of business
continuity planning in healthcare is still largely unknown, the refining of risk and hazard
identification and of prioritization in healthcare is present in nearly every facet of healthcare.
Truly minimizing the impacts that risks and hazards may have on an organization requires more
than the identification and prioritization of risks. It requires that the scoring of those risks is
meaningful and actionable by healthcare leaders. In order to evoke action and needed change to
mitigate hazards and risks to the organization, leaders need to understand the information and
implications of the information being presented in a format that they understand. Healthcare
leaders are compelled by objective and quantifiable data regarding operations and finances,and
for that reason the inclusion of this information into the summary of identified risks and hazards
makes sense.
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Appendix: Kaiser Permenente Emergency Management Tool
SEVERITY = ( MAGNITUDE - MITGATION )
PROBABILITY ALERTS
Event

ACTIVATIONS HUMAN
IMPACT

Likelihood this
will occur

SCORE

0=
1=
2=
3=

N/A
Low
Moderate
High

Number of
Alerts

Number of
Activations

BUSINESS
IMPACT

PREPAREDNESS

INTERNAL
RESPONSE

EXTERNAL
RESPONSE

Possibility of
Physical
dealth or injury losses and
damages

Interuption of
services

Preplanning

Time,
effectiveness,
resources

Community/Mu
tual Aid staff
and supplies

0=
1=
2=
3=

0=
1=
2=
3=

0=
1=
2=
3=

0=
1=
2=
3=

0 = N/A
1 =High
2 = Moderate
3 = Low

N/A
Low
Moderate
High

PROPERTY
IMPACT

0=
1=
2=
3=

N/A
Low
Moderate
High

N/A
Low
Moderate
High

N/A
High
Moderate
Low

N/A
High
Moderate
Low

RISK

* Relative threat

0 - 100%

Active Shooter
Acts of Intent
Bomb Threat
Building Move
Chemical Exposure, External
Civil Unrest
Communication / TelephonyFailure
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Epidemic
Evacuation
Explosion
External Flood
Fire
Flood
Forensic Admission
Gas / Emmissions Leak
Generator Failure
Hazmat Incident
Hazmat Incident with Mass Casulaties
Hostage Situation
Hurricane
HVAC Failure
Inclement Weather
Infectious Diseae Outbreak
Internal Fire
Internal Flood
IT System Outage
Landslide
Large Internal Spill
Mass Casualty Incident
Natural Gas Disruption
Natural Gas Failure
Other
Other Utility Failure
Pandemic
Patient Surge
Picketing
Planned Power Outages
Power Outage
Radiation Exposure
Seasonal Influenza
Sewer Failure
Shelter in Place
Strikes / Labor Action / Work Stoppage
Suicide
Supply Chain Shortage / Failure
Suspicious Odor
Suspicious Package / Substance
Temperature Extremes
Tornado
Transportation Failure
Trauma
Tsunami
VIP Situation
Water Contamination
Water Disruption
Weapon
Workplace Violence / Threat
Zombies
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Kaiser Permanente Summary Page
ALERT TYPE
Command Center Activation
Patient Care Impacts
Business / Operational Impacts
Structural Impacts
Resource Request
Recovery Plan Activated
AAR
Total Alert

OCCURRENCE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1

Command

1

Patient Ca

1

Business /

0

Structural

0
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
0
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]

Resource
Recovery P
AAR

2018
TOP 10 HVA

2018
RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OCCURRENCE

TOP 10 ACTUAL ALERTS

OCCURRENCE HVA RANK
0
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Proposed Addition to Kaiser Permanente HVA Tool – Financial Impact Summary Tab
Projected Length of Disruption to Service Types (Hours)

0
TOP 10 HVA - FINANCIAL IMPACTS

RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

LOD - Inpatient
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

LOD - Outpatient
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Est. $ Loss

Projected Financial Loss to Service Types ($)

LOD - ER
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Inpatient $ Loss
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Total Hourly Revenue Per Service Type

$

ER $ Loss
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Outpatient $ Loss
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$

Proposed Addition to Kaiser Permanente HVA Tool – Financial Impact Data Input Tab

Inpatient Services
Operational
Hours Each
Week
# of Hours
Open Each
Week
(24/7=168 hrs)

Rank

FACILITY
FINANCIALS
Budgeted
Annual Gross
Revenue

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS
Projected # of
Hours
Impacting
Services

% of
Operations
Able to be
Maintained

Outpatient Services
FINANCIAL IMPACTS

% of Svcs to be
Recovered

Total $ of
Additioal
Expenses

Operational
FACILITY
Hours Each
FINANCIALS
Week
# of Hours
Budgeted
Open Each
Annual Gross
Week
Revenue
(24/7=168 hrs)

OPERATIONAL IMPACTS
Projected # of
Hours Impacting
Services

% of
Operations
Able to be
Maintained

Emergency Room
Operational
FACILITY
FINANCIAL IMPACTS
OPERATIONAL IMPACTS
Hours Each
FINANCIALS
Week
# of Hours
Projected # of
% of
Budgeted
% of Svcs to Total $ of Additioal
Open Each
Hours
Operations
Annual Gross
be Recovered
Expenses
Week
Impacting
Able to be
Revenue
(24/7=168 hrs)
Services
Maintained

FINANCIAL IMPACTS
% of Svcs
to be
Recovered

Total $ of
Additioal
Expenses

Top Three Identified Hazards

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Facility Data Collection 1 of 2
Facility Name
Person Filling Out Form
Facility Leader
Facility Financial Director

XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX

Use facility annual budget to complete the step below

Projected Annual Gross
Revenue ($)

Inpatient
$

Outpatient
$

Emergency Room
$

Use the top three hazards in your Hazard Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) to complete the step below
Event 1

Event 2

Event 3

List the scheduled hours per week for each of the services listed below

Hours/Week

Inpatient Outpatient

ER

List the estimated total disruption (hours) of services for each of the three listed events listed below
(Hours)
Event 1
Event 2
Event 3

Inpatient Outpatient
0
0
0
0
0
0

ER
0
0
0

List the estimated percentage of normal operations you can maintain during/ following a disaster below

% Svcs
Functional
Event 1
Event 2
Event 3

Inpatient Outpatient
0
0
0

0
0
0

ER
0
0
0
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Facility Data Collection 2 of 2
List the estimated percentage (%) of services lost or canceled during a disaster that would be recovered/rescheduled
below
% Svcs
Recovered
Event 1
Event 2
Event 3

Inpatient Outpatient
0
0
0

0
0
0

ER
0
0
0

List any projected additional expenses to be incurred by the facility during each of the events listed below
Additional
Expenses
($)

Increased Labor
Costs($)

Increased
Supplies/Consumable
Costs ($)

Increased
Contractual
Expenses ($)

Increased
Repair/Replacement
Costs ($)

Event 1

$0

$0

$0

$0

Event 2

$0

$0

$0

$0

Event 3

$0

$0

$0

$0
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